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Abstract This paper presents the family of the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S, cf. Dosi
et al, J Econ Dyn Control 34 1748–1767 2010, J Econ Dyn Control 37 1598–1625
2013, J Econ Dyn Control 52 166–189 2015) evolutionary agent-based models,
which study the effects of a rich ensemble of innovation, industrial dynamics and
macroeconomic policies on the long-term growth and short-run fluctuations of the
economy. The K+S models embed the Schumpeterian growth paradigm into a com-
plex system of imperfect coordination among heterogeneous interacting firms and
banks, where Keynesian (demand-related) and Minskian (credit cycle) elements feed
back into the meso and macro dynamics. The model is able to endogenously gen-
erate long-run growth together with business cycles and major crises. Moreover, it
reproduces a long list of macroeconomic and microeconomic stylized facts. Here,
we discuss a series of experiments on the role of policies affecting i) innovation, ii)
industry dynamics, iii) demand and iv) income distribution. Our results suggest the
presence of strong complementarities between Schumpeterian (technological) and
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Keynesian (demand-related) policies in ensuring that the economic system follows a
path of sustained stable growth and employment.
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While Schumpeter may be the source of great insights into the capitalist
process, he did not leave a useful theoretical framework for the analysis of cap-
italism. On the other hand further progress in understanding capitalism may
very well depend upon integrating Schumpeter’s insights with regard to the
dynamics of a capitalist process and the role of the innovative entrepreneurs into
an analytical framework that in its essential properties is Keynesian. (Minsky
1983, p. 2)
1 Introduction
The work of Joseph Schumpeter emphasized innovation as the ultimate source of
economic growth. More precisely, “Schumpeterian” growth models are characterized
by three features: i) growth is fuelled by innovation and imitation processes, which
lead to the emergence and diffusion of new products and more efficient production
techniques; ii) innovation is motivated by (some) monopoly rents for the innovators
themselves; and iii) “creative destruction” is incessantly at work, as new technologies
replace old ones, provoking the growth and entry of some firms (and sectors) in the
economy and the fall and exit of others.1
Schumpeter’s insights are of paramount importance for the understanding of the
processes driving changes in technology. However, his framework is incomplete
when it comes to explaining how innovation translates into growth and how the effect
of the inherent instability of technical change processes can be tamed (Minsky 1983;
Dosi et al. 1988). In one direction, technological innovations may impact the long-
term rate of growth of the economy, as well as the short-term evolution of output (and
unemployment) over the business cycle. In the other one, macroeconomic conditions
(i.e. aggregate demand, credit availability, etc.) are likely to modulate the creation
and diffusion of technological innovations and the long-run performance of the econ-
omy. In that, the analysis of the (imperfect) coordination mechanisms2 among a large
1According to such a paradigm, losses are inherent to the growth process, and also, normatively, technol-
ogy policy measures should be expected to fail a good deal of the time, hoping for a few large successes
(Scherer and Harhoff 2000).
2Such coordination is not to be mistaken for strategic interactions among a few forward-looking firms.
The latter is indeed incompatible with a Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921) concerning the future path
of technology advances as well as of demand in complex evolving systems.
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number of heterogeneous agents become essential for understanding the forces allow-
ing the economic system to follow a relatively orderly growth path in presence of
innovation and creative destruction processes.
A proper investigation of the above mechanisms requires us to go well beyond
the Schumpeterian separation between coordination and change (Dosi 2012), and
needs to be done in models able to account jointly for both business cycles arising
from effective demand failures (Leijonhufvud 1973) and long-term growth dynamics.
Unfortunately most economic research has not followed such a path. Even Schum-
peterian growth models, including both evolutionary models rooted in Nelson and
Winter (1982) and equilibrium models rooted in Aghion and Howitt (1992), have
focused on technological and industrial dynamics, not considering the possible role
of aggregate demand on the evolution of technology, let alone macroeconomic per-
formance (few notable exceptions include Aghion et al 2010, 2014; Ciarli et al
2010). Much more so, DSGE models of business cycles (e.g. Woodford 2003) do not
explicitly address any long-run instability issue, and take technology as an exoge-
nous process. A major consequence is that policymakers are left empty-handed when
they need to evaluate the potential long-term effects of their short-run responses to
economic crises. Likewise, they may under-estimate the overall impact of structural
policies, in the belief that the long-term benefits would be left unaffected by the tem-
porary costs these policies may involve. A paradigmatic example in this respect is
the apparent schizophrenia between fiscal and innovation policies implemented in
Europe in the wake of the Great Recession (Fiscal Compact vs. Europe 2020).
The Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) models (Dosi et al. 2010; Dosi et al. 2013; Dosi
et al. 2015) explicitly address the multifaceted interactions between long-run pro-
cesses of technical change and demand-driven dynamics. Accordingly, they are
well-equipped to explore jointly the short and long-run effects of economic poli-
cies, affecting the technological landscape as well as aggregate demand. This paper
discusses the large body of results generated by the K+S model so far. As such, it
offers a comprehensive overview of i) the theoretical framework, ii) the stylized facts
reproduced by the model and iii) the policy results.
Rooted in the evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982, see also; Dosi et al. 1988)
and agent-based (e.g. Tesfatsion 2006) perspectives3, the K+S models encompass
both Schumpeterian and Keynesian elements. The former relates to the processes of
technical change and market selection, the latter concerns coordination mechanisms
and aggregate demand. Moreover, the models explicitly account for the interactions
between the real and the financial sectors of the economy, thus reproducing the Min-
skian features of business cycles (Minsky 1986). The full-fledged version of the
model describes an economy with heterogeneous firms (belonging either to a capital-
or consumption-good industry), banks, a labor force, a Central Bank and a Govern-
ment. Innovation and imitation routines performed by capital-goods firms investing
3For germane ABMs, see Ciarli et al. (2010), Mandel et al. (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Delli Gatti
et al. (2010), Ashraf et al. (2011), Dawid et al. (2014a), Dawid et al. (2014b), Raberto et al. (2014), and
Riccetti et al. (2013).
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in R&D drive the process of technical change, resulting in cheaper and more pro-
ductive machines sold to the consumption-goods sector. The latter firms produce a
homogeneous final good and may use external financing from the banking sector if
their internal resources do not cover production and investment expenses. Both firms
and banks can go bankrupt if their net worth becomes negative, possibly triggering
a crisis. The Government fixes taxes and unemployment subsidy rates and bails out
bankrupt banks. The Central Bank sets the baseline interest rate for the economy.
The Keynes+Schumpeter models are able to generate endogenously long-run
growth together with business cycles and major crises. Moreover, they reproduce a
long list of macroeconomic and microeconomic stylized facts. They can be employed
to assess the short- and long-run impact of a series of experiments concerning the role
of policies affecting i) innovation, ii) industry dynamics, iii) aggregate demand, and
iv) income distribution. Our results suggest the presence of strong complementarities
between Schumpeterian (technological) and Keynesian (demand-related) policies in
ensuring that the economic system follows a relatively ordered path of sustained
growth. In addition, we find that increasing income inequality has detrimental effects
on the short- and long-run performance of the economy (vindicating Stiglitz 2012),
thus supporting the case for redistributive fiscal policies.
In what follows, we present the basic K+S model in Section 2 and its extensions
in Section 3. Next, we report the micro and macro empirical regularities reproduced
by the models (Section 4). The core of the paper presents the policy experiments
(Section 5). Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the results, highlighting the feed-
back effects between the Schumpeterian, Keynesian and Minskian elements of the
model.
2 The baseline Keynes+Schumpeter model
In the first vintage of the model (Dosi et al. 2010), the economy is composed of
two sectors: a capital-goods sector including F1 firms (denoted by the subscript i),
and a consumption-goods sector with F2 firms (denoted by the subscript j ). In the
former group, firms perform R&D investments and produce heterogeneous machines
using labor. The consumption-goods firms buy machines from capital-goods firms
and produce a homogeneous final good for consumers, using capital and labor. There
are also LS consumers/workers and a public sector that collects taxes on firm profits
and pays unemployment benefits.
2.1 The timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic decisions take place in
sequential order:
1. Machine-tool firms perform R&D, trying to discover new products and more
efficient production techniques and to imitate the technology and the products
of their competitors. They then advertise their machines to consumption-goods
firms.
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2. Consumption-goods firms decide howmuch to produce and invest. If investment is
positive, consumption-goods firms choose their suppliers and send their orders.
3. In both industries, firms hire workers according to their production plans and
start producing.
4. The imperfectly competitive consumption-goods market opens. The market
shares of firms evolve according to firm competitiveness following some sort of
replicator dynamics.
5. Entry and exit take place. In both sectors, firms with (near) zero market shares
and/or negative net liquid assets are eschewed from the two industries and
replaced by new firms.
6. Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered and become part
of the capital stock at time t + 1.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employ-
ment...) are computed, summing over the corresponding microeconomic variables.
2.2 The capital- and consumption-good sectors and industry dynamics
Capital-goods firms use labor to produce heterogeneous machine-tools. They invest
a fraction of their past sales in R&D to search for process and product innovation and
imitation, which are risky ventures. Successful process innovation/imitation increases
their own labor productivity (Bi,t ), while product innovation/imitation impacts the
productivity of the machines they sell to consumption-goods firms (Ai,t ), thus on the
quality of their product.
Prices are defined with a fixed mark-up over unit cost. The market is characterized
by imperfect information: machine-tool firms advertise their products’ price and pro-
ductivity characteristics by sending “brochures” to a subset of consumption-goods
firms, which in turn change their suppliers if they are offered a combination of a
lower price and unit production costs. Note that, in any given period, different types
of machines are supplied in the market, also within the same “time vintage”. The
speed of diffusion of the best practice-types in the economy depends on the evolu-
tion of the market share of their supplier, on competitors’ imitation rates, as well as
on consumption-goods firms’ investments.
Innovation and imitation processes are modeled as a two-step procedure. First,
only a subset of capital-goods firms successfully innovate (or imitate), and the prob-
ability of such event is positively related to their R&D expenditures (RDi,t ). As
investment in R&D is proportional to past turnover, firms have an increased chance of
innovating and imitating in presence of buoyant demand and when their higher com-
petitiveness increases their market share. More precisely, a draw from a Bernoulli
distribution of parameter θini,t determines whether a firm successfully innovates:
θini,t = 1 − e−ζ1ξRDi,t , (1)
with 0 < ζ1  1. Access to imitation is granted in a similar way, according to
parameter ζ2 ∈]0; 1]. The ζ1,2 parameters thus define firms’ search capabilities.
The innovation process is not always successful: the technology embodied in
the new machine discovered by the firm may be inferior to the one embodied in
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its current vintage. Indeed, the innovating firm draws a new machine embodying
technology (Aini,t , B
in
i,t ) according to:
Aini,t = Ai,t (1 + xAi,t ) (2)
Bini,t = Bi,t (1 + xBi,t ),
where xAi and x
B
i are two independent draws from a Beta(α1, β1) distribution over
the support [x1, x1] with x1 belonging to the interval [−1, 0] and x1 to [0, 1]. By
altering the shape of the Beta distribution, the parameters α1 and β1 capture the
technological opportunities of the economy. Regarding imitation, in the second
stage, the probabilities of firms to copy the technology of their competitors decrease
in the technological distance (computed adopting Euclidean metrics).
Consumption-goods firms produce a homogeneous good using both capital and
labor under constant returns to scale. They define their desired level of production
according to adaptive demand expectations, given their current inventories. If their
production capacity is not sufficient, firms invest to expand their capital stock. More-
over, firms invest to replace obsolescent machines. More precisely, each firm’s stock
of capital is made of a set of different vintages of machines j,t , with heteroge-
neous productivities. Machines with technology Aτi,t ∈ j,t are scrapped according
to a payback period routine that considers their technology obsolescence and new
machines’ prices:
RSj,t =
{
Aτi,t ∈ j,t :
p∗t
c(Aτi,t ) − c∗t
≤ b
}
, (3)
where c(Aτi,t ) is the production cost entailed by the machine under evaluation, p
∗
t and
c∗t are the price and unit cost of production of new machines, and b > 0 is the pay-
back period parameter. Total replacement investment is then computed at firm level as
the number of scrapped machines satisfying Eq. 3, and those older/worse than η vin-
tages (η > 1). Firms’ investment impacts their labor productivity level as the newly
acquired machines embed a more “advanced” technology vintage. Consumption-
goods firms pay the ordered machines and advance wages to workers. They finance
their investments and production using preferably internal funds and, if necessary,
credit. Capital markets are imperfect (in line with Stiglitz andWeiss 1981; Myers and
Majluf 1984; Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993; Hubbard 1998, and indeed with common
sense): external funds are more costly than internal ones. As firms can borrow up to
a debt to sales ratio threshold 
, credit rationing may occur.
Prices of final goods (pj,t ) are obtained by applying a variable mark-up (μj,t ) on
consumption-goods firms’ unit cost of production (cj,t ). More precisely, the mark-
up is increasing in the firm’s market “power”, proxied by its revealed variations in
market share. The latter evolves according to a “quasi” replicator dynamics:
fj,t = fj,t−1
(
1 + χ Ej,t − Et
Et
)
, (4)
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with χ > 0. The above equation implies that firms with high competitiveness Ej,t
relative to the sector average (Et ) expand their market shares. Firms’ competitiveness
(Ej,t ) directly relates to their price, but also, inversely, to the possible amount of
unfilled demand (lj,t ) inherited from the previous period:
Ej,t = −ω1pj,t − ω2lj,t , (5)
where ω1,2 > 0. All consumption-goods firms start with an initial (and homoge-
neous) mark-up μ, which evolves according to the dynamics of their market shares
fj :
μj,t = μj,t−1
(
1 + υ fj,t−1 − fj,t−2
fj,t−2
)
. (6)
In both sectors, the difference between firm revenues and costs accounts for firms’
gross profits, which are taxed at the flat rate tr . Net profits change the stock of liquid
assets (NWj,t ) of firms. A firm goes bankrupt if NWj,t < 0 or its market share falls
to zero. In both cases, the firm exits the market and it is replaced by a new entrant. As
a consequence, the number of firms operating in each market is fixed (a simplifying
assumption, but not too far from the empirics). In line with the empirical literature
on firm entry (Caves 1998; Bartelsman et al. 2005), new firms are typically smaller
than incumbents: the stock of capital of new consumption-goods firms and the stock
of liquid assets of entrants in both sectors are a fraction of the average stocks of
incumbents.4 Finally, the technology of new capital-goods firms is bounded by the
one of the most productive incumbent and it is drawn from a Beta distribution of
parameters α2, β2. Such parameters define the technological opportunities available
to entrants and alter their distance to the technological frontier.5
2.3 Consumption and the Government sector
Workers in both capital- and consumption-goods sectors earn a wage that is con-
sumed. The wage rate (wt ) evolves according to institutional factors, namely, changes
in prices, in the unemployment rate and in average labor productivity. As a con-
sequence, involuntary unemployment emerges endogenously whenever the sum of
labor demand from all firms (LDt ) is lower that the exogenous labor supply (L
S).
The Government pays an unemployment subsidy (wut ), which is proportional to the
current wage: wut = ϕwt , with ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. Aggregate consumption is then:
Ct = wtLDt + wut (LS − LDt ).
4The stock of capital of a new consumption-goods firm is obtained by multiplying the average stock of
capital of the incumbents by a random draw from a Uniform distribution with support[φ1, φ2], 0 < φ1,<
φ2  1.
5Here, as well as in Aghion and Howitt (2007), firms’ distance to the frontier affects the impact of different
sets of policies, as well as the overall performance of the economic system.
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All aggregate variables (e.g. output, investment, employment, etc.) are the out-
come of the complex interactions among heterogeneous agents’ micro level decisions
and dynamics. At the aggregate level, national account identities are satisfied:
the sum of value added of capital- and consumption-goods firms (GDPt ) equals
their aggregate production and final expenditures, namely, private consumption,
investment (It ) and change in inventories (Nt ):
GDPt =
F1∑
i=1
Qi,t +
F2∑
j=1
Qj,t ≡ Ct + It + Nt .
3 Extensions: the credit-augmented K+S model
Building on the initial setup presented and tested in Dosi et al. (2010), the model
has been extended (Dosi et al 2013, 2015) introducing a credit market populated by
heterogenous banks in order to study the possible interplays between the real and
financial sectors. Such addition allows us to investigate the role of credit in ampli-
fying and triggering macroeconomic fluctuations, possibly leading to the emergence
of bank and sovereign debt crises and deep downturns that could affect the long-run
performance of the economy (see Levine 1997, explicitely opposing Schumpeter’s
view on that). The credit sector is populated by B heterogenous banks, which gather
deposits, distribute loans and own sovereign bonds. In addition a Central Bank now
sets the baseline interest rate following a Taylor rule.
Banks are heterogenous in their number of clients (drawn form a Pareto distri-
bution). Credit supply is constrained by capital adequacy requirements inspired by
Basel-framework rules. Besides the regulatory limit, we assume that banks maintain
a buffer over the regulatory capital level, as indicated by the empirical evidence (BIS
1999). The size of such buffer evolves strategically in order to offset bank financial
fragility along the business cycle and it is proxied by the ratio between accumu-
lated bad debt (i.e. loans in default) and bank assets (i.e. sum of the stocks of loans,
sovereign bonds and reserves held by the bank), Bdak,t . Total credit supply available
from bank k at time t therefore follows:
T Ck,t =
NWbk,t−1
τb(1 + βBdak,t−1) , (7)
where β > 0 is a parameter that measures the banks’ speed of adjustment to its
financial fragility, and τb is the macroprudential regulatory parameter. Credit supply
therefore decreases in β and τ and is positively affected by banks’ equity.
Banks allocate credit across firms by ranking them according to their creditworthi-
ness, proxied by the ratio between firms’ past net worth and sales. Loans are granted
to firms as long as credit supply is not exhausted. As a consequence, consumption-
goods firms may be credit-rationed. Firms’ probability to get a loan depends on their
credit ranking as well as on the financial health of their bank. Note that the lower per-
formance of other clients improves firms’ relative ranking, but also bears a negative
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impact on total credit availability, because firms’ defaults weaken the equity of their
bank, thus reducing the supply of credit.
We assume that the Central Bank follows a Taylor rule, which adjusts the inter-
est rate to changes in inflation and, under some revealing policy scenarios, to
unemployment, relative to their target levels:
rt = rT + γπ(πt − πT ) + γU(UT − Ut), γπ > 1, γU ≥ 0 (8)
where πt is the inflation rate of the period, Ut the unemployment rate, and
rT , πT , UT are the target interest, inflation and unemployment rates, respectively.
Banks fix the interest rate on loans applying a risk premium on the policy rate.
Bank revenues are composed of interests from loans, deposits at the Central Bank,
and sovereign bonds. Gross profits are taxed at the rate tr . Massive loan losses may
turn profits to negative, reducing the equity of banks and their credit supply. A bank
goes bankrupt if firm bankruptcy shocks turn its net worth to negative. In such a case,
the Government steps in and recapitalizes the bank. The public bail-out entails a cost
(Gbailoutt,k), equal to the difference between the equity of the failed bank before
and after the intervention, which affects the public budget.
Given government tax revenues (T axt ) and expenses, public deficit reads:
Deft = Debtcostt + Gbailoutt + Gt − T axt , (9)
where Gt are unemployment subsidies and Debtcostt is the cost of sovereign debt.
Deficits are financed on the bonds market, where banks buy the bonds issued by the
Government. Banks buy bonds with their net profits; if the total bank savings are
lower than the stock of sovereign debt that needs to be refinanced, the Central Bank
buys the residual part.
4 Macro and micro stylised facts
The Keynes+Schumpeter models are analyzed through Monte-carlo simulations.6
To begin with, we study whether the models are able to reproduce jointly a wide
range of macroeconomic and microeconomic stylized facts (SF, the “benchmark”
parametrization is reported in Table 6 in the Appendix). If the K+S models success-
fully match empirical regularities concerning industrial dynamics as well as more
structural relations between macroeconomic aggregates, this ought to be taken as a
robust empirical validation (G. Fagiolo and Windrum 2007; Fagiolo and Roventini
2012), offering plausibility to its use as a “computational laboratory” to test differ-
ent policy experiments. We report in Table 1 the list of empirical regularities that the
K+S model is able to match (cf. Dosi et al, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015). Note,
6The non-linearities present in agents’ decision rules and their interaction patterns require extensive
Monte-carlo simulations to analyze the properties of the stochastic processes governing the coevolution of
micro- and macro- variables, washing away across-simulation variability. Consequently, all results below
refer to across-run averages over 100 replications. Admittedly, this whole exercise involves a major puz-
zle: should one wash out the inherent path-dependency of evolutionary processes? Should one account for
within-path long-run dependency? But these questions are well beyond the scope of this work.
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Fig. 1 Output, consumption and investment time series; left: logs; right: bandpass-filtered (6,32,12)
series, reproduced from Dosi et al. (2015)
incidentally, that the fact that a large number of very different micro and macro styl-
ized facts are reproduced by the model makes our empirical validation exercises far
more demanding than a simple polynomial-fitting exercise in presence of some free
parameters.
Let us start with macroeconomic empirical regularities. The K+S models are able
to generate endogenously self-sustained economic growth with persistent fluctua-
tions (SF1, cf. Fig. 1). Business cycles are punctuated by deep downturns (Stiglitz
Fig. 2 Distribution of real GDP growth rates: binned simulated densities (250 bins, 59900 observations,
circles) vs. normal fit (Dosi et al. 2015)
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Fig. 3 Exponentail fit of recession durations (Dosi et al. 2015)
2014) and, in line with the empirical evidence (Fagiolo et al. 2008), the GDP growth-
rate distribution exhibits fat tails (SF2, cf. Fig. 2). Moreover, most recessions are
short-lived; few last for long periods of time. The distribution of the duration of reces-
sions generated by the model is exponential (SF3, cf. Fig. 3) as found in empirical
data (Ausloos et al. 2004; Wright 2005).
We then detrend the macroeconomics series to study their behavior at the busi-
ness cycle frequencies. Well in tune with the empirical evidence (e.g. Stock and
Watson 1999; Napoletano et al 2006), the fluctuations of aggregate consumption
are smoother than those of GDP, whereas investment is more volatile than output
(SF4, cf. Fig. 1, right). Moreover, the co-movements between GDP and the most
important macroeconomic variables are in line with what found in real data (SF5):
consumption is pro-cyclical and coincident, net investment, changes in inventories,
productivity, nominal wages and inflation are pro-cyclical; unemployment, prices and
mark-ups are counter-cyclical; the real wage is a-cyclical.7 Finally, R&D investment
is pro-cyclical (SF6, see e.g. Walde and Woitek 2004).
The K+S models match additional stylized facts concerning credit dynamics and
banking crises. To begin with, we find that bank profits as well as firms’ total debt are
pro-cyclical, while loan losses are counter-cyclical (SF7, see e.g. Lown and Morgan
2006; Leary 2009). Moreover, in line with the empirical evidence (Mendoza and Ter-
rones 2012), we find that credit surges anticipate banking crises: banks’ loan losses
are positively correlated with a lag with firm debt, suggesting that higher levels of
credit precede bad debt, further depressing banks’ equity (Foos et al. 2010, SF8).
Finally, the duration of banking crises, defined as a period in which at least one bank
7Details of the validation exercise are not included here due to space limitations. See Dosi et al. (2006),
Dosi et al. (2008), Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013), and Dosi et al. (2015) and (Napoletano et al. 2012)
for more discussions.
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fails, has similar qualitative properties as the empirical one (Reinhart and Rogoff
2009, SF9) and the distribution of the ratio of fiscal costs of banking crises to GDP
is characterized by excess kurtosis and heavy tails (SF10).
The K+S models are also able to match a rather long list of microeconomic empir-
ical regularities concerning the cross-sectional dynamics of firms (Bartelsman and
Doms 2000; Dosi 2007). First, firm (log) size distributions are highly skewed and
not log-normal (SF11). Moreover, firm growth-rate distributions are “tent-shaped”
with tails fatter than the Gaussian benchmark (SF12, cf. Bottazzi and Secchi 2003,
2006). Firms are also extremely heterogeneous in terms of productivity (SF13) and
such differences are persistent over time (SF14). In line with the empirical evidence
(Doms and Dunne 1998), firms invest in a lumpy fashion (SF15). Finally, firms’
bankruptcies are counter-cyclical (Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008, SF16, cf.), and the
distribution of firms’ bad debt at bankruptcy follows a power law (SF17), in tune
with the empirical evidence (Di Guilmi et al. 2004).
5 Micro and macro policies
Given the extremely good interpretative performance of the model, let us employ
it to assess the short- and long-run impact of different policies.8 More specifically,
we study the impact of changes in either parameter values or policy scenarios on
the GDP growth rates, the ratio of public debt to GDP, output volatility, and the
unemployment rate.9 We consider here policies affecting the two main sources of
economic change, namely innovation (Section 5.1) and demand (Section 5.2), that is,
the “Schumpeterian” and “Keynesian” engines of growth. Finally, we consider the
impact of the income distribution on the effectiveness of policies (Section 5.3). The
full list of experiments introduced in Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013), and Dosi
et al. (2015) and discussed here as well as their corresponding parameter values are
spelled out in Table 7 in the Appendix.
5.1 Tackling with the Schumpeterian engine: Innovation policy matters
We start by considering how technology policies concerning firm search capabilities
and technological opportunities affect the long-run performance of the economy and
also its short-run dynamics (Section 5.1.1). Next, we study a set of policies targeting
appropriability conditions and the industrial dynamics of the economy (entry and
competition, cf. Section 5.1.2).10
8Interestingly, most statistical regularities concerning the structure of the economy appear to hold across
an ample parameter range, under positive technological progress, even when policies undergo the changes
we study in the following.
9In Napoletano et al. (2012) and Dosi et al. (2013) and Dosi et al. (2015) we also consider statistics related
to the probability of large crises.
10The results of the experiments concerning technology and industry policies are drawn from Dosi et al.
(2010).
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5.1.1 Technology policies
In the first set of experiments, we alter the “innovation engine” and test the impact
on growth as well as on business cycle indicators. The results are reported in Table 2,
the entries in which are normalized by the statistics (output growth, GDP volatility
or unemployment) obtained in the benchmark parameterization.
In the Keynes+Schumpeter models, the innovation process proceeds in two steps
(cf. Section 2.2): first, a subset of capital-goods firms successfully draw an “inno-
vation” (no matter whether good or bad), and second, these “innovators” draw the
technology of the newly discovered machines. Thus, success in the first stage depends
on firms’ search capabilities (cf. Eq. 1). The level of technological opportunities
affects the probability of firms to develop a machine-tool more advanced than their
current vintages. Those are proxied by the characteristics (support and shape) of the
Beta distribution from which the new productivity parameters are drawn (cf. Eq. 2).
The first experiment alters the probability successfully to pass the first stage (through
the ζ1,2 parameters, E1). In the second experiment (E2), we tune technological
opportunities by shifting leftward and rightward the mass of the Beta distribution.
Our results support the notion that policies favoring innovation promote faster
GDP growth: lower search capabilities and lower technological opportunities yield
significantly lower growth rates than in the baseline, whereas high values have a pos-
itive impact on the performance of the economy. Seen from a policy perspective, this
is to say that all measures affecting both corporate innovative capabilities and the
overall “state of knowledge” of the industry bear an impact upon the long dynamics
of the economy. And technology policies do affect also the short-run: in both exper-
iments, faster growth is also associated with lower unemployment rates. Note also
that the magnitude of the effects is larger when policies affect the richness of the pool
of potential innovations.
Table 2 Technology policy experiments
Experiment E1 E2
Search Technological
capabilities opportunities
low high low high
GDP growth 0,917** 1,063** 0,774** 1,250**
(7,425) (5,657) (25,491) (22,274)
GDP volatility 1,020 0,958** 0,981 1,023*
(1,505) (3,198) (1,411) (1,919)
Unemployment rate 1,097 0.962 1,266** 0,956
(1,345) (0,592) (4,031) (0,658)
Normalized values compared to the benchmark across experiments, for 100 simulation runs. Absolute
value of the simulation t-statistic in parentheses; (**) significant at 5 % level, (*) significant at 10 % level
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Table 3 Industrial policy experiments
Experiment E3 E4 E5 E6
Patents Entrant expected prod. Market selection Antitrust
length breadth low high weak strong weak strong
GDP growth 0,960** 0,647** 0,726** 1,492** 1,000 0,992 1,052** 1,083**
(3,536) (39,802) (19,137) (43,841) (0,000) (0,707) (4,596) (9,391)
GDP volatility 0,941** 0,780** 0,986 0,862** 1,038** 0,933** 0,863** 0,628**
(4,515) (17,981) (0,792) (12,148) (2,916) (5,857) (12,040) (94,626)
Unemployment rate 1,056 1,240** 1,308** 0,796** 1,169** 0,955 0,966 0,781**
(0,768) (3,074) (3,376) (3,191) (2,364) (0,659) (0,546) (3,814)
Normalized values compared to the benchmark across experiments, for 100 simulation runs. Absolute value of the
simulation t-statistic in parentheses; (**) significant at 5 % level, (*) significant at 10 % level
5.1.2 Industrial policies
The second set of experiments concerns the impact of policies affecting appropriabil-
ity conditions and industry dynamics (experiments E3-E6 in Table 3). A tricky but
important issue - both from the interpretative and normative points of view - regards
the role of appropriability (and, in particular, patents) as an incentive or an obsta-
cle to innovation. The notion that some departure from the competitive zero profit
condition is necessary in order to motivate capitalists to undertake search with their
own money is at the core of the Schumpeterian (but also, earlier, Marxian) view of
endogenous innovation. But how big should be such a departure? Neo-Schumpeterian
models, as known, tend to assume monotonicity between degrees of appropriability
and intensity of search, and, thus, rates of innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1992).11
The assumption, other things equal, in turn rests upon some form of “rational techno-
logical expectations”. Conversely, evolutionary models abhor the latter and assume
much more routinized search behaviors. Recently, a large body of theoretical and
empirical literature (see e.g. the contributions to Cimoli et al 2014) have suggested
that stricter property rights could be detrimental to innovation and growth. We test
the two alternative hypotheses, introducing a patent system in the K+S model (E3).
In the first patent scenario (“length only”), firms cannot imitate new technologies for
a fixed number of periods. In the second patent regime (“breadth”), firms are also for-
11By replacing their leapfrogging assumption (the entrant innovator instantaneously takes over the entire
market) with a “step-by-step” innovation process (the entrant has to catch-up with the technology - and
tacit knowledge - of the incumbent before potentially becoming a leader), Aghion et al. (2013) explain
that the effect of patent protection on innovation becomes more complex. In particular, the traditional
incentive to innovate to escape competition is much attenuated in unleveled sectors, where laggards will
prefer to catch-up with the leader by imitating than costly investing in R&D to innovate, given the remote
probability that they may overtake the market.
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bidden to innovate around newly discovered technologies. The results go against the
view that patents are essential for innovation and good macroeconomic performance.
Indeed, the introduction of a patent system significantly harms both the long-run
GDP growth and the short-run performance of the economy, being conducive of
persistently higher unemployment rates.
Furthermore, we test the effects of entry on competition and innovation by chang-
ing entrants’ expected productivity (E4). We know empirically that most entrants are
failures, but some are carriers of novel techniques and products (Dosi et al. 1997; Bel-
lone et al. 2008; Aghion et al. 2009). How important are these successful entrants?
That is, from the normative point of view, what is the impact of policies favouring the
entry of new competent firms? We explore that question by increasing/decreasing the
probability that entrants draw high productivity levels. In line with a “Schumpeterian
Mark I” scenario, we find that higher easiness of “good” entry bears a positive impact
upon long-term growth, and also dampens business cycles fluctuations and reduces
unemployment.
Finally, we explore the effect of competition (and relatedly, competition policies)
by altering market selection in the consumption-good industry (E5) and by intro-
ducing antitrust policies in the capital-good sector (E6). Recall that the strength
of competition is captured by the χ parameter (cf. the replicator dynamics, Eq. 4)
linking firms’ competitiveness to their change in market shares: a lower value of
the parameter proxies higher sluggishness in the selection process (Metcalfe 1994).
Antitrust policies limit the maximum market share of capital-goods firms to 75%
(weak case) or 50% (strong case). The results of both policy experiments overall
support the view that long- and short-term macroeconomic performance positively
respond to enhanced competition. It is important to notice, however, that the mecha-
nism does not involve changes in firms’ strategic behavior, but relates to the need for
a variety of innovation search paths to be tested before a success can emerge.
5.2 The necessity of Keynesian fiscal policies: demand matters
The above sets of experiments clearly indicate that the sources of growth in the
model lie in firms’ ability to search efficiently and to develop improved products
and processes. However, such results are obtained under an effectively working Key-
nesian engine of macro demand management. What happens if one constrains the
dampening effect of Keynesian policies? A first rough but very robust answer comes
from the comparison between the foregoing regime with a set-up whereby all “Key-
nesian” policies are turned off and the system lives under a “pure Schumpeterian
regime”, holding however constant technological opportunities, search rules, com-
petition dynamics as in the benchmark model (E7, cf. Dosi et al 2010). Turning off
the “Keynesian” component implies a major jump to a different phase of the system,
characterized by nearly zero growth and enormous fluctuations (cf. Table 4, column
2). This is because, by sustaining demand during recessions, countercyclical Keyne-
sian policies also smooth investment over the business cycle. Low demand indeed
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Table 4 Keynesian policy experiments
Experiment E7 E8 E9
Schumpeterian regime Stabilizers Fiscal rule
pure strong weak strong very strong SGP SGPec
Subsidy rate 0 0 0,2 0,6 0,8
Tax rate 0 0 0,05 0,15 0,2
GDP growth 0,139** 0.437** 1,008 0,996 1,008 0.527** 0.992**
(17,837) (7.841) (0,707) (0,354) (0,707) (6.894) (1.388)
GDP volatility 19,611** 19,173** 1,902** 0,779** 0,722** 14.645** 1.624**
(47,186) (34,426) (28,119) (20,808) (24,405) (7.466) (7.166)
Unemployment rate 10,962** 7,327** 2,413** 0,789** 0,562** 5.692** 1.948**
(37,639) (24,353) (8,846) (3,738) (8,271) (8.095) (3.928)
Public Debt/GDP +∞ 4.078**
(2.472)
The “strong” Schumpeterian regime is set with high technological opportunities and high search capabili-
ties. Normalized values compared to the benchmark across experiments, for 100 simulation runs. Absolute
value of the t-statistic in parentheses; (**) significant at 5 % level, (*) significant at 10 % level
reduces both consumption-goods firms’ investment and capital-goods firms’ R&D
expenses, thus rates of innovation and productivity growth. Such a vicious circle of
low R&D, low economic growth and high volatility is in line with previous accounts
by Stiglitz (1994) and Aghion et al. (2010) and Aghion et al. (2008), in particular in
the presence of credit market imperfections (Aghion et al. 2014).
The experiments discussed above indicate that both Schumpeterian and Keynesian
policies affect short-term economic indicators (GDP volatility, the unemployment
rate) as well as long-term ones (GDP growth). Still, these experiments were imple-
mented considering “everything else being equal”: an active technology policy was
tested taking fixed the fiscal side of the model, and the other way round. Could tech-
nology policies be a substitute for a lack of fiscal policies? We test this proposition by
experimenting with a “strong Schumpeterian regime” (high search capabilities and
technological opportunities) combined with a zero fiscal policy scenario (no taxes
and unemployment subsidies). Table 4 (column 3) shows that in this case average
GDP growth falls by 56 % with respect to the baseline. Notice that it is exactly the
net effect from both policies. Indeed, the former increase the average GDP growth
rate (respectively, by 6 and 25 %), while the latter has a negative impact amounting
to a 86 % cut in the long-run rate of output growth. It follows that Keynesian policies
are complementary to Schumpeterian ones, as the latter alone cannot sustain a stable
growth path.
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As a more sophisticated observation, let us analyze the impact of macro policies
in the presence of some Keynesian element, and consider both the role of automatic
stabilizers (taxes and unemployment subsidies) and the impact of austerity fiscal rules
(mimicking the Eurozone Stability and Growth Pact).
In the K+S benchmark model, taxes and unemployment subsidies act as auto-
matic stabilizers, dampening business cycle fluctuations. In experiment E8 (Dosi
et al. 2010), we jointly modify the intensity of these stabilizers by altering the tax
and subsidy rates tr and ϕ (cf. Section 2.3). Results in Table 4 show the impact
of Keynesian fiscal policies upon long-run economic growth. In the “good phase”
of the system (i.e. with positive tax and subsidy rates, cf. Fig. 4), higher levels of
automatic stabilizers do not affect average GDP, but they further stabilize output fluc-
tuations: GDP volatility and unemployment rates fall as tax and subsidy rates are
jointly increased.
We further test the impact of Keynesian fiscal policies by studying the impact of
austerity fiscal rules a` la European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, cf. Dosi et al
2015). More specifically, the SGP rule constrains the public deficit to 3 % of GDP,
forcing the Government to cut unemployment subsidies until the deficit-to-GDP tar-
get is reached. In presence of an escape clause (SGPec), the fiscal rule is frozen in
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Fig. 4 Fiscal Policy Experiments (Dosi et al. 2010). First panel: average output growth rate. Second
panel: bandpass-filtered output standard deviation. Third panel: average unemployment rate (unemp.) and
full-employment frequency (full emp.). In such policy experiments, the unemployment subsidy rate (ϕ) is
four times the tax rate
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case of negative GDP growth. The results from the SGP and SGPec experiments
(E9, see Tables 4 and 5) allow one to highlight further the necessity of active fis-
cal policy to achieve steady growth. Indeed, we find that in the “harsh” case, when
the SGP fiscal rule is applied, average GDP growth is halved compared to the base-
line scenario, and GDP volatility and unemployment are respectively 14 and 5 times
higher. Moreover, the public debt to GDP ratio explodes due to the joint expan-
sion of debt and the shrinkage of output, showing the self-defeating effect of fiscal
discipline policies. The microeconomic indicators displayed in Table 5 study the
underlying micro-level mechanisms at the origin of the aggregate outcomes. First, in
Table 5 Fiscal rule - microeconomic indicators
Experiment E9
Fiscal rule
SGP
Innovation creation
in the capital-good sector
Share of successful innovators 0.946**
(2.762)
Productivity growth 0.980**
(2.269)
Productivity dispersion 0.917**
(6.538)
Innovation diffusion
in the consumption-goods sector
Productivity growth 0.889**
(3.912)
Productivity dispersion 0.865**
(3.429)
Investment rate 0.973
(1.275)
Duration of best vintage 1.037**
(3.927)
Productivity growth best vintage 0.954**
(34.446)
Relative distance between 0.970**
best and worst vintages (2.432)
Normalized values compared to the benchmark across experiments, for 100 simulation runs. Absolute
value of the t-statistic in parentheses; (**) significant at 5 % level, (*) significant at 10 % level
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the consumption-goods sector, due to lower expected demand, firms’ investment rate
falls and with it, the productivity growth, thus slowing innovation diffusion. Relat-
edly, in the capital-good sector, innovation creation is less frequent: by constraining
demand for final goods, and thus, the investment rate, austerity also reduces R&D
investment, the innovation rate, and productivity growth. The slower creation and dif-
fusion of innovations imply that the best vintage stays undisputed for a longer period,
and the productivity frontier evolves more slowly. As a consequence, productivity
dispersion is also lower in both sectors.
In the presence of a fiscal rule with escape clause (SGPec), the long-run harmful
effects of fiscal discipline disappear, but volatility and unemployment rates are still
significantly higher (see Table 4). These findings allow us to understand better the
non-linear effects of fiscal policies on GDP growth (cf. Fig. 4): the halt to fiscal
support during recessions is likely to transform them in depressions, as firms’ cuts in
their investment and innovation rates affect, also in the long-run, aggregate demand,
innovation, output creation, skyrocketing public debt.
5.3 Income inequality and policy effectiveness: Distribution matters
In Dosi et al. (2013), we find that the level of income inequality affects both the short-
and long-run performance of the economy,12 increasing macroeconomic instability
and reducing the growth potential. In line with the Keynesian tradition, income dis-
tribution in the K+S models is modulated by the level of the initial mark-up (μ, E10).
More precisely, the role played by mark-up rates is twofold. On the one hand, the
level of the mark-up determines the profits of the firms, and thus the level of internal
resources available to finance production and investment expenditures. Higher mark-
ups imply, ceteris paribus, higher profits and thus a lower dependence of firms on
the external financing provided by banks. On the other hand, the mark-up regulates
the distribution of income between profits and wages. Since aggregate consumption
depends on wage shares, higher mark-up rates result in a lower level of demand for
final-good firms.
On the policy side, we find a strong interaction between fiscal policies and inequal-
ity (i.e. high μ), and the latter exacerbates macroeconomic instability by reducing
aggregate demand (Dosi et al. 2013; Dosi et al. 2015). This is shown in Figure 5,
which compares short-run and long-run macroeconomic indicators under different
fiscal policy scenarios (the benchmark and “SGP” scenarios) for different levels of
the (initial) mark-up rate. As the figure starkly reveals, all effects of fiscal auster-
ity are magnified when the mark-up is high and thus the income distribution is more
skewed towards profits.
12This is in line with the intuitions of Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty (2014) about the existence of a vicious
downward spiral of excessive inequality and economic instability.
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Fig. 5 Fiscal rules (Dosi et al. 2015). Confidence-interval bands are shown in a lighter colour and are
computed as plus or minus twice Monte-carlo standard errors
More generally, in the K+S models (Napoletano et al 2012; Dosi et al 2013, 2015),
we observe a U-shaped relation between short-run macroeconomic performance and
income inequality. For high values of the initial mark-up, high unemployment and
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GDP volatility correlate with the instability of demand. Conversely, when income
distribution is too much skewed toward wages, firms become more dependent on
external finance, and are more exposed to failure in the case of adverse shocks. In
such scenarios, firms become more sensitive to changes in the cost and the quantity
of credit.
In our models, in line with the general lack of any evidence, at least at the micro
level, of a negative relationship between the cost of capital and investment, inter-
est rates do not affect micro investment behaviors unless their desired levels cross
a (high) threshold (E11). After such threshold, firms become highly dependent on
external finance and higher firm bankruptcy rates are observed. In turn, higher
bankruptcy rates weaken banks’ balance sheets, and, in the presence of, say, the Basel
rule, further reduce credit availability. The whole system becomes more volatile and
less resilient to shocks. As we discuss at greater length in Napoletano et al. (2012),
the emergence of two different growth regimes is due, given adaptive expectations,
to the constraints on internal cash flows and credit availability.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
The “Schumpeterian” growth literature written large, with different underlying inspi-
rations, rooted in both the evolutionary literature tradition and the neoclassical
paradigm (and various combinations thereof), has provided key insights about the
sources and mechanisms driving technical change, industry and macroeconomic
growth. At the same time, most “Schumpeterian” contributions have provided
so far a limited account of how effective demand coordination mechanisms and
creative-destruction processes can affect the performance of the economy.
In this work, we presented a family of evolutionary agent-based models, the
“K+S” formalism, which combines both “Schumpeterian” (innovation-driven) and
“Keynesian” (demand-driven) mechanisms. Encouraged by the K+S models’ abil-
ity to reproduce several stylized facts relating to short- and long-run macroeconomic
dynamics of an economy, as well as to the cross-sectional dynamics of firms, we
employed the model to analyze the effects of an ensemble of micro and meso policies
concerning the a) search capabilities of firms, b) the pool of technological oppor-
tunities available for innovation, c) the degree and breadth of patent protection, d)
the strength of market selection and competition. In line with previous works in the
Schumpeterian growth literature (e.g. Dosi and Nelson 2010; Aghion et al 2013),
we find that an increase in technological opportunities and a higher entrant-carried
search have a strong and positive effect on the long-run performance of the econ-
omy. Conversely, strengthening the patent protection deters growth. Together, we also
find a positive, but much weaker effect of stronger market competition on long-run
growth.
Furthermore, we analyzed the impact of different types of fiscal policy. We show
that active fiscal policies have a positive effect on unemployment and output stabi-
lization in the short-run. Moreover, the beneficial effects of fiscal policy persist in
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the long-run, as they allow the economy to reach higher growth paths. In contrast,
fiscal austerity measures have a detrimental effect on the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of an economy, both in the short- and in the long-run. In addition, austerity is
self-defeating as it implies an explosion of government debt.
Overall, our experiments point to a strong complementarity between Keynesian
and Schumpeterian policies. More precisely, when fiscal policies are not in place, the
long-run growth of the economy collapses even in the presence of a strong Schum-
peterian regime characterized by a high degree of technological opportunities and
firms’ search capabilities.
The presence of aggregate demand effects in the long-run (and the consequent ben-
eficial role of fiscal policy) constitutes one of the key contributions of the K+S family
of models. Two main transmission channels explain such results. The first is gen-
uinely “Keynesian”: investment of consumption-goods firms depends on (adaptive)
expectations about future demand. In turn, such dynamics generate fluctuations in
investment, the effects of which propagate to the long-run via their impact on capital-
good firm sales and R&D expenditures. The second channel is essentially “Minskian”
(see e.g. Minsky 1986): in good times, firms invest more and more, partly by raising
their leverage, gradually weakening their balance sheet and leading to increased rates
of bankruptcy. In that, the presence of a “Basel rule”, linking credit supply to banks’
equity, provokes a credit crunch right when the economy is entering a downturn.
Active fiscal policy smoothes out the instability of the matching between demand-
driven processes of production and investment, on the one hand, and Schumpeterian
processes of technical change, on the other. In turn, the feedbacks between innovation
and demand dynamics call for a coordinated set of policies, going against the pecu-
liar schizophrenia between macro policies, if any, for the short-run and “structural”
policies for the long-run.
The K+S family of models is currently being extended along three different lines.
First, the possible connections between climate change, innovation and climate poli-
cies are studied by including an energy sector and carbon emissions in the standard
K+S model (Lamperti et al. 2016). Second, Dosi et al. (2016b) provide an explicit
microfoundation of the labor market, studying the performance of the economy
under alternative labor market regimes characterized by different degrees of flexibil-
ity. Finally, we assess the role of different expectation rules on the dynamics of the
economy in Dosi et al. (2016a).
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Table 6 Benchmark Parameters
Description Symbol Value
Number of firms in capital-goods industry F1 50
Number of firms in consumption-goods industry F2 200
R&D investment propensity ν 0.04
R&D allocation to innovative search ξ 0.50
Beta distribution support (innovation process) [x1, x1] [−0.15, 0.15]
New-customer sample parameter γ 0.50
Capital-goods firm mark-up rule μ1 0.04
Desired inventories ι 0.10
Payback period b 3
“Physical” scrapping age η 20
Mark-up coefficient υ 0.04
Competitiveness weights ω1,2 1
Maximum debt/sales ratio 
 2
Uniform distribution supports [φ1, φ2] [0.10,0.90]
(consumption-goods entrant capital)
Uniform distribution supports [φ3, φ4] [0.10,0.90]
(entrant stock of liquid assets)
Bond interest rate mark-up μbonds −0.33
Shape parameter of bank client distribution paretoa 0.08
Bank capital adequacy rate τb 0.08
Capital buffer adjustment parameter β 1
Parameters used in the experiments (baseline values)
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process) (α1, β1) (3,3)
Firm search capabilities parameters ζ1,2 0.30
Beta distribution parameters (α2, β2) (2, 4)
(capital-goods entrants technology)
Replicator dynamics coefficient χ 1
Tax rate tr 0.10
Unemployment subsidy rate ϕ 0.40
Fiscal rule max deficit to GDP (SGP,FC) defrule 0.03
Interest Rate r 0.01
Consumption-goods firm initial mark-up μ(0) 0.30
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